The Weekly Lemur aims to inform readers about the most pressing issues domestically, internationally, and on Duke University’s campus through bite-sized and digestible coverage filtered through the prism of “big ideas.” We like to take readers out of just the headlines and situate ongoing events in a larger intellectual and historical context. Alejandro Nina Duran contributed to this week’s edition.
As the United States and Iran initiated diplomatic talks in Oman this weekend, Washington’s festering concern with the prospect of Iranian nuclear proliferation is now in the hands of the Trump administration. During Trump’s first administration, the U.S. abrogated the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, which, in Trump’s view, was the “worst deal ever.” The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a historic multilateral effort to curtail Iran’s nuclear capabilities in the long run. Six years after the first Trump administration pulled out of the JCPOA, Iran-U.S. relations have, at best, remained tenuous and have seemed to follow a historical downward trajectory since the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
Trump 2.0, on the other hand, seems poised to change that. This edition of the Weekly Lemur seeks to paint, albeit in broad strokes, a comprehensive backdrop preceding the results of the 2025 Oman talks that reveal the complexity of U.S.-Iran diplomacy, the political stakes for Washington and Tehran, and how Trump should learn from his prior “maximum campaign” strategy.
As the current administration gauges Iran’s intentions, it is imperative to look at U.S.-–Iran relations and how the modern state of Iran came of age during the Iranian Revolution of 1979. During the revolution, supporters of the Muslim cleric Ruhollah Khomeini and other dissidents overthrew the Western-backed shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. During that same year, they proceeded to take 52 American hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. For Iran’s clerical elite and Khomeini, an anti-Western dogma collectively unified them and ensured political stability following the revolution. Additionally, Iran continued to widen their scope of influence throughout the years by creating a full-fledged “axis of evil,” as George W. Bush dubbed it. Their support of Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, Shiite militias in Iraq, and then-Syrian president Bashar al-Assad posed a substantial threat to U.S. interests after the fall of the shah. This revolutionary spirit would be essential to how they approached nuclear negotiations. Over the years, several administrations have rightly ousted Iran as an international pariah. President Ronald Reagan, after determining the Iranian government was involved in the Lebanon bombing that killed 241 U.S. Marines, levied sanctions against them as retaliation. Subsequent administrations, like the Clinton and 2001 Bush administrations, continued to sequester Iran politically and economically.
President Trump’s first term was a crusade against Iranian influence, scrapping the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in exchange for a “maximum pressure” campaign against the regional aggressor. In Mohammed Nuruzzaman’s paper, President Trump’s ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign and Iran’s Endgame, this campaign was a three-pronged strategy utilizing “political, military, and economic tools.” The Trump administration’s most impactful tool was its economic sanctions, which have impoverished Iranian citizens. Sanctions, albeit damaging to their economy, likely did not change Iran’s plan for nuclear eminence. Trump’s draconian sanctions sought to manipulate the country’s cost-benefit calculations by disrupting domestic circumstances. By inciting domestic economic turmoil in the form of anti-government protests, Trump hoped Iran would come crawling back to the negotiations table. Instead, Iran has remained steadfast and, counterintuitively, emboldened in the face of economic pressure. The Trump administration’s past financial strangulation has allowed Iran’s middle class to shrink and, inadvertently, galvanize Iranian hardliners to embolden its citizens against effective compromise. On the other hand, an unintended side effect of Trump’s sanctions would be that by isolating Iran, it encouraged Syria’s al-Assad to strengthen ties with Russia by substituting Iran’s financial support with Russia’s to continue his autocratic regime. While Trump’s maximalist demands exacerbated foreign relations and have likely sped up Iran’s nuclear capacity, his administration was careless in not correctly assessing the primary motivations behind their defiance.
Iran’s resistance to such pressure is emblematic of its fractious political landscape. While the unelected conservative clerical establishment, like Ayatollah Khamenei, believes in a revolutionary spirit, centrist and reformist forces, like former President Hassan Rouhani, align with a more realpolitik approach that seeks to normalize relations with Western forces. These domestic tensions complicate commitment to nuclear deals like the JCPOA. As the Middle East undergoes a new regional order, Iran is keen to hold on to their atomic infrastructure as more leverage against adversaries. For the current administration to succeed, “maximum pressure” with Iran is insufficient and is counter to U.S. interests. The administration needs a blueprint for effective diplomacy to bring Iran and the United States’ divergent viewpoints towards a middle ground—and continue from there. For Iran, their nuclear capacity is one of the few—if not only—bargaining chips they have left.
Between the maximalist demands of complete atomic surrender and permitting Iran’s continued nuclear development, both Washington and Tehran will have to compromise where, for Iran, the benefits outweigh the costs. Yet, what stands in President Trump’s way is a firm trust that Iran will hold their end of the bargain. U.S.-Israel relations might strengthen negotiations if the U.S. can effectively compel both actors to refrain from hostilities. If the Iranians can distance themselves from supporting proxies such as the Houthis and Hamas, Israel might initiate a more friendly posture in negotiations that is crucial for advancing a new Iran deal. However, Iran’s historically recalcitrant nature and its firm belief that Israel is a “cancer” that must be eradicated poses political challenges for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli citizens. On the American home front, Trump’s political influence on domestic politics can make even Washington’s most fervent hawks welcome Iranian rapprochement—paralleling President Richard Nixon’s visit to China to thaw relations between Beijing and Washington.
As the U.S. heads for its first serious nuclear talks with Iran since May 2023, the complex and tangled nature of a situation that will define the balance of global atomic authority must be approached with a fine-toothed comb. Trump and his administration will need all hands on deck and, in the words of the Godfather’s Don Corleone, make Iran “an offer [they] can’t refuse.”
‘Til next week (…and apologies for the delay this week!),
The Weekly Lemur
