Emma Ren is a sophomore majoring in Philosophy. This piece was adapted from an essay originally written for the class Political and Social Philosophy with Professor Gopal Sreenivasan .
What is Liberty?
What is the definition of liberty? To be able to act on your will? Or to not be influenced by others? Phillip Pettit would argue that neither is the epitome of freedom. In the first two chapters of his book Republican, Pettit advocates non-domination as the republican tradition of liberty distinct from the conventional understandings of liberty. Non-domination transcends the absence of interference or the achievement of self-mastery and lies in the assurance that one is not subject to the arbitrary will of another. This essay aims to explore Pettit’s argument for non-domination by diving into the detailed definition of domination, articulating the distinctiveness of non-domination by juxtaposing it to Berlin’s positive and negative liberties, and addressing the possible counterargument.
To grasp the concept of non-domination as a form of liberty, one must understand what constitutes domination. Pettit defines domination as the capacity for interference on an arbitrary basis by a dominating entity, which may be personal, collective, or corporate (Pettit, 52).
Pettit outlines three critical aspects that characterize domination:
- Capacity for Interference: The dominating party possesses the ability to exert intentional influence against the dominated party’s interest through a spectrum of methods. This ranges from overt physical coercion, such as direct obstruction or the levying of threats, to more insidious tactics like manipulation or distorting beliefs. Crucially, the defining feature of this capacity is not predicated on the actual execution of interference but rather on the potential or modal condition to do so (Pettit, 53). In other words, the mere ability of the dominating party to interfere, regardless of whether this power is actively employed, establishes the groundwork for domination. Domination hinges on the perpetual threat of arbitrary interference and imbalance of power rather than the actual act of interference.
- Arbitrary Interference: The arbitrary interference is executed at the whim of the dominating party to the detriment of the dominated party. The dominating party essentially has an “untrammeled” choice to impose an “unbearable cost” on the dominated party and can act on their unchecked judgment without subjection to potential retaliation or consequences (Pettit, 55). The arbitrary aspect underscores the lack of accountability or justification on the part of the perpetrator, highlighting the unilateral nature of domination.
- Certain choices the dominating party is in a position to make: Domination is neither absolute nor ubiquitous; individuals may experience domination in certain aspects of their lives or during specific periods, illustrating the situational and partial nature of domination (Pettit, 58).
To elucidate the concept of domination, Pettit references the arbitrary power wielded over the colonists by the British Parliament through imposing taxes without representation. This situation exemplifies the core of Pettit’s definition of domination: it was not merely the act of taxation that constituted domination but the Parliament’s capacity to impose further arbitrary interference against the interests of the colonists without repercussions (Pettit, 34).
Britain dominated the colonists and infringes on their liberties by having the power to levy taxes continuously without any expense to themselves, a power they can exercise whenever they desire. Even if they didn’t act, the colonists’ fear of being taxed unreasonably at the whim of Britain was antithetical to Pettit’s definition of freedom.
Non-Domination vs. Isaiah Berlin’s Positive and Negative Liberty
Defining domination allows Pettit to set non-domination apart from Isaiah Berlin’s famous binary framework of positive and negative liberty, which has significantly shaped contemporary discourse on social and political freedom. Berlin characterizes negative liberty as the absence of interference—which can range from physical coercion, like imprisonment, to the more subtle forms of verbal threats–allowing individuals unimpeded choice (Pettit, 17). In contrast, positive liberty, according to Berlin, necessitates gaining mastery of oneself. This occurs when one’s higher self, which is concerned with disciplined and rational decision-making to pursue what is truly good, gains control over the lower self, which is driven by instinctual needs and desires (Pettit, 17). In turn, positive liberty in the political context involves active democratic involvement as an exercise of their self-mastered will. (Pettit, 18)
Pettit challenges Berlin’s constraining, binary framework by arguing that non-domination, as a distinct, third form of liberty, embodies aspects of both negative and positive liberty without fully aligning with either (Pettit, 19). Intermediate of positive liberty’s emphasis on self-mastery and negative liberty’s focus on the absence of all interference, non-domination highlights a state where individuals are not subject to the whims of others, merging the absence of mastery of others to perpetrate non-arbitrary interference. Pettit emphasizes its unique distinctions in his critique, demonstrating why non-domination stands apart as a concept of freedom.
Non-Domination and Democracy
Pettit distinguishes non-domination from positive liberty as they assign different roles to democracy. Active political involvement serves as a means to eliminate arbitrary power rather than an end in itself for non-domination. This instrumental view contrasts sharply with that of positive liberty, which views democracy as an end for individuals to act autonomously and express their true selves. Pettit articulates that non-domination is the republican conception of liberty, which is fundamentally aligned with combating the evils of arbitrary interference above championing the virtues of democratic participation (Pettit, 27). He posits that republicanism historically prioritized protection and private security over the pursuit of public power or the expansion of democratic mechanisms. In fact, this preference is evident from the Roman era, where people without the right to vote were considered free citizens as their liberty was determined by their status of being free from domination rather than being politically active (“cives sine suffragio”) (Pettit, 27).
The Master-Slave Analogy
Pettit delineates between non-domination’s immunity from arbitrary interference and negative liberty’s mere absence of interference by delving into the master and slave scenarios. He illustrates the concept that one can suffer from domination without direct interference with the dynamic between a master and a slave because even in the absence of active interference from the master, the slave remains dominated due to the ever-present potential for arbitrary imposition. This scenario reveals that negative liberty, characterized by the mere absence of interference, may still coexist with domination if one is under the power of another who can interfere without consequence but doesn’t at the moment (Pettit, 22). Conversely, Pettit introduces the notion of non-domination through the figure of a non-mastering interferer, who, unlike a master, only engages in non-arbitrary interference that genuinely benefits the person affected much like “an agent who enjoys a power of an attorney” in one’s affairs (Pettit, 23). Pettit further elucidates this distinction by arguing that non-domination doesn’t focus on merely the lack of interference but the modal condition that guarantees the absence of arbitrary control that goes against the affected party’s interests. Republicanism, therefore, aspires not just to a state where individuals are free from interference but to one where they are immune to the whims of arbitrary domination from the powerful (Pettit, 22). This invulnerability from arbitrary interference embodies the essence of non-domination, ensuring individuals can live without the anxiety of undue influence over their lives, thereby enabling them to act on their choices and defend their opinions without fear (Pettit, 25).
Critique of Non-Domination
While Pettit’s theory of non-domination offers a compelling third perspective on liberty, defenders of Berlin’s positive and negative liberty could argue that non-domination, aimed at protecting individuals from arbitrary interference, operates under the assumption that people have a clear grasp of their own interests. This critique hinges on the complexity inherent in distinguishing between immediate desires, or the “lower self,” and long-term, rational interests, or the “higher self.” Such a distinction is crucial within the realm of positive liberty and introduces potential ambiguities in the application of non-domination. Critics may contend that this gray area could allow authorities to justify interventions and claim actions to be non-arbitrary and not constitutive of domination when they act on people’s “lower self” interests, actions that do not truly represent a person’s true, “higher”, interests. However, since people cannot always distinguish whether their interests are influenced by their higher self, this situation complicates who determines citizens’ genuine interests and the practical implications of the legitimacy of state actions that are deemed non-arbitrary under the framework of non-domination. In this case, non-domination is essentially just justifying certain interference that negative liberty disallows. So, is it really a distinct form of liberty, or is it just giving excuses to those in power to enforce interference and encroach on our freedom?
I would argue that this argument fails to consider the fundamental premises of Pettit’s argument. Pettit’s approach does not necessitate a division of the self into higher and lower realms but regards individuals as integrated wholes, capable of making decisions that reflect their values, preferences, and circumstances at any given time. The focus of non-domination is not on prescribing what interests individuals should pursue or ensuring they consistently make choices that align with an idealized self-mastery. Instead, it is about ensuring that the social and political structures within which individuals operate do not impose arbitrary and unjustified constraints on their freedom. Thus, even in the absence of positive liberty in the sense of achieving self-mastery, individuals can still experience the profound freedom that comes from living in a state of non-domination, where their autonomy is respected and protected. Non-domination is concerned with the external conditions of one’s freedom — specifically, that no individual or group has the power to arbitrarily interfere in one’s life — rather than the internal psychological or moral state of self-mastery that Berlin’s concept of positive liberty emphasizes. Therefore, different from positive liberty, the uncertainty or ambiguity regarding whether individuals are acting on their “higher self” does not detract from their state of non-domination.
Non-Domination in Governance
While Pettit diverges from the traditional emphasis on active democratic participation found in theories of positive liberty — which often regard such participation as integral to the essence of liberty itself — he acknowledges the significance of establishing a relationship between the government and its citizens that empowers them to overturn laws that operate against their favor. Pettit asserts that the government can only interfere under “constitutionally determined conditions” and that such actions are “subject to appeal and review”(Pettit, 65). This principle is pivotal to preventing covert arbitrary interference under the guise of non-domination, ensuring that governmental power is wielded within a legal and transparent structure aimed at safeguarding individuals from undue interference. Pettit also acknowledges that laws themselves can be discriminatory—that the system can act against the interests of the people. Hence, it is critical to have legal mechanisms that allow individuals and communities to contest and amend laws institutionalizing discrimination or embodying arbitrary power. This approach not only mitigates the risk of domination but is central to the concept of non-domination, as it empowers people to challenge and rectify unwarranted intervention. It ensures that even constitutionally sanctioned laws are subject to the scrutiny and consent of the governed, thereby reinforcing the principles of liberty under non-domination.
Furthermore, any governmental justification for intervention that does not align with the true interests of the people constitutes a form of arbitrary interference. Even in theory, non-alignment betrays the very essence of non-domination, whether it be through coercion or manipulation. Such actions directly impact the autonomy of individuals by narrowing their range of options, distorting expected benefits, and diminishing actual outcomes. Such actions that degrade the quality and diversity of choices available to individuals would be non-arbitrary no matter how governments cloak interventions under the guise of non-domination. Therefore, non-domination cannot be a weapon used by officials to expand their sphere of influence if it does not work in the favor of the people.
Conclusion: Pettit’s Vision of Liberty
Pettit’s discourse on non-domination critiques the limitations of Berlin’s paradigms of liberty by providing a more compelling vision of autonomy that is resilient in the face of the powerful. Rooted deeply in the republican tradition, Pettit’s argument redefines the essence of liberty by emphasizing the importance of protection from arbitrary interference rather than mere participation in democratic processes or the absence of coercion. Pettit’s concept of non-domination challenges us to reconsider the foundational aspects of liberty, advocating for a society where individuals are not merely free from interference but are also empowered to live lives of their own making, unencumbered by the shadow of domination.
Source: Pettit, Republicanism (Clarendon, 1997), chh. 1 and 2.
By Emma Ren
