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The Vice of “Obligation” in the Modern University


When I first arrived at Duke a few months ago, a veritable stranger in a strange land, I made one perhaps surprising observation: my professors are subject to various constraints—on their time, energy, and passions—that I did not expect at all in the life of the college academic. I’ve learned that faculty are, in various ways, tied down by administrative obligations that prevent them from doing what they love: attending meetings, coordinating logistics in their department, setting up office hours (I could go on). I’ve observed a forced willingness, tense and unnatural, carved into the faces of professors when they must answer a student’s questions after class. I could go on. I’ve also observed it in the life of the student. After a summer in which I focused on doing all that I love to do, I’m confronted now by the cumbersomeness that I can only find in the word “obligations.”

In the world today, obligation is a norm of university life—the image of students and faculty members hustling around campus carrying out various responsibilities is seen as a sort of virtue, a justification even to counter life’s aimlessness. But our common attitude towards obligation has not been shared in the past, as the 20th-century Catholic philosopher Josef Pieper reminds us. InLeisure: the Basis of Culture, Pieper says that “the Greek word for leisure (σχολή) is the origin of Latin scola, German Schule, English school.” Leisure sharply contrasts with what our school is in practice. But, reading this, I thought, maybe naively, “Ah, leisure is what school ought to have!”

A liberal arts education, Pieper goes on to tell us in the same book, loses its meaning when ignoring its counterpart, the servile art. The servile art describes actions as a means to an end, not as an end in itself, so it owes its justifications in the results it can produce, but liberal art requires no justifications whatsoever: its mere existence is its affirmation. Music and poems are not means, but we congregate in the concert halls, and even as little children set our pens to wander in the infinite sky of poetry, since those pursuits have intrinsic aesthetic values. So, too, when industrial workers toil among the puffs of smoke to earn a meager salary; when political candidates vie, days and nights, for the taste of power; and when when we work, argue, sweat, and have no rest, only to enjoy the temporary leisure at school, to read poetry for poetry’s sake, to listen to the carillon rehearsal for music’s sake. And so I sighed: “Ah, leisure is what school ought to have!”

But, during my precious time to witness and experience leisure at Duke, I have found instead that faculty, of all people, are obligated to the same bureaucracy that I find elsewhere: a lengthy syllabus is necessary so it’s immune from student complaints; faculty members are required to answer after-class questions, even when they’re just from particularly pushy students who are taking up too much of the professor’s time; office hours are expected to be always available; and so on. Faculty obligation seemingly is a result of university administration, but the administration is only an intermediary step through which students are the cause. A faculty’s superior relation to a student, a tradition that was venerated as long as academia was established as an institution, is inverted by the obligation that students lay on faculty. We often feel entitled as students, as if tuition can, when the sum is large enough, not only obligate but justify the obligation that we indirectly set. This does not just apply to wealthy students: in a sense, the tuition payments of the wealthy subsidize this smug inverted hierarchy for all students, no matter background, over faculty.

When students, encouraged by the university’s subservient attitude towards them and the American maxim that “the customer is always right,” see themselves as entitled consumers, faculty become service workers: they cannot return to the ancient age when money didn’t bind them to any obligations, except virtues like respect and humility; when their motives stemmed not from money but a voluntary will. Socrates, long ago, could freely teach whatever he wanted, while his students could pay whatever they had. Confucius told his disciples that some dried meat, as a gift symbolizing respect, is sufficient to enter the kingdom of learning. Students don’t pay to obligate faculty to teach, but faculty teach so they “obligate” the students to pay. The wisdom accorded to faculty was once seen as infinitely more superior than wealth; any obligations that the latter claimed to lay on the former were ludicrous; to conflate the two, not to say to elevate the latter to a higher status, was and I think still should be a categorical mistake. But, the vulnerability that non-tenure track faculty feel reflects the preponderant weight that money, not their actual wisdom, plays even among faculty. Money may appear to abide through time: in many ways, among which the amount of tuition (inflation adjusted) for an education, it does, but wealth is no longer the demeaning tool to purchase material goods, but, in our age that worships wealth, it can command respect and impose obligations. Whereas money couldn’t buy something as fluid as respect in the past, now it usurps in its influence, so that things originally not transferable are held as equivalent.

Although a minor tweak in the system that once existed, the faculty’s obligation indicates a larger, more pernicious social phenomenon. The internal attribute that confers status on someone in a given group, such as parents whose life experiences warrant their place within a family, a governor whose virtue commands respect and obedience within a state, is now replaced by something as fluid and external as wealth. One would think that status should be constituted by something much more secure and fundamental, like experience and virtue, but the allure of wealth, touching every corner and object, leaving even the untouched tainted and obscure, supersedes everything that we hold dear. The qualities that make one noticeable in this anonymous world are never virtues, but the outward appearances that testify to wealth and a sense of good taste; in the world at large, as a mistake that I’m guilty of, we unconsciously ignore most passersby, but a few people’s posture and attire, something so superficial, grabs our attention. Even faculty members, whose wisdom once structured a secure relationship between students and themselves in academia, now willingly concede, by their participation in the modern bureaucracy, that wealth, after all, determines one’s status and denigrates wisdom.

The rules set by obligation, when disassociated with wealth and taken on their own, are seemingly innocuous, and even immensely beneficial, since responsibilities make faculty’s actions accountable and predictable. A large bureaucracy, further, may never be able to operate without these adhesive elements that cohere the individuals with the system (it is only fair that all faculty be subject to the same requirements). But the vast network of obligations contrasts jarringly against the past freedom enjoyed in the liberal arts tradition. Not only were individual activities our institution supposedly cultivated free from obligations, but the institution itself also wasn’t bound by systematic rules and responsibilities, but instead by the individuals’ sheer willingness in the academia to teach and to learn. The School of Athens, as depicted by Raphael, was so dynamic that it would verge on absurdity when thinking office hours and the school could coexist. Through a historical lens, then, the dramatic claim that obligations are dispensable both in individual activities and institutions is not so dramatic and may even be rendered as truthful. But let’s go beyond this intuitive claim to examine systematically the ramifications of obligations.

I used the word “obligation” intentionally. The influential legal philosopher, H. L. A. Hart, in The Concept of Law, distinguished between “obligation” and “to be obliged.” Let’s look at the latter first. When one is obliged to do X, the impending punishment in the instance of disobedience is clear and forceful. Although this forcefulness is distasteful to many, it is, in fact, embedded in the common parental injunction: “You ought not to do this.” There’s something beautiful in its absolutism and straightforwardness that I think is gradually lost in a culture that only knows how to compromise. When rights and wrongs become arbitrary, obliged actions re-establish expectations and standards as something more than preferences.

Obligation, on the other hand, describes actions compelled by social attitudes and slight threats that are not as forceful as “to be obliged.” While one is obliged through fear, obligation is associated with many other factors, and complex ones. It’s often misused in excuses like the common complaint: “I’m doing this out of obligation!” The claim that one’s motive derives solely from obligation disguises the selfish concerns that lurk behind the obligation’s facade. Or vice versa, when one wants to conceal their obligations entirely, they try to signal that they are doing something because they actively want to: “I’m acting with pure love!”

The nature of obligation makes life tricky for faculty who actually do want to perform some of the things they are obligated to do. For example, faculty who truly do love answering student questions may, in their motives, feel uncertain whether they are obeying professional obligation. But uncertainty isn’t the only thing at stake. Our motives for doing things become less spontaneous and more cumbersome when we realize we might not be able to freely withdraw from them due to obligation. Because of grades and deadlines, we complete assigned readings not due to sheer enjoyment but duty. Faculty members who love to answer student questions, in the same way, are losing their original desires when reminded daily that their teaching styles (when reflected in student course evaluations) can account for the salary they earn, as well as tenure and other privileges. So when professors ask themselves whether they are freely committing themselves to answering these questions, they are painfully reminded that in answering them their eagerness shouldn’t depend on whether the question is covered by the reading material, the student attitude, or their inclinations, but, under obligation’s constraint, should assign each question with the same numbing weight. Confucius, taken as a paradigmatic counterexample to the prevailing cultural norm, could only become a well-known teacher because he doesn’t need to sacrifice his unique teaching styles to the standard of conformity that now quashes faculty. These professors can become, in a sense, an emotionless machine that answers the questions despite the different circumstances in which they are asked, the justified and the unjustified, when, of course, a professor wants most to engage with a good and interesting question, not an annoying one they are forced to answer!

One may object that the obligation’s negative effects are outweighed by its contributions. Weekly office hours, a seemingly unflagging willingness to reply to student questions, and a substantive syllabus are necessary to conform the faculty to a standard of accountability, both to students and the administration. But, given that most faculty are obviously willing to teach without coercion (consider the historical examples cited earlier), the administrator’s stringent standard unnecessarily casts them into the same mold, when they are inherently different. No longer can a professor dismiss the after-class questions one week, but be enthusiastic to engage in a debate until nighttime during another. One may also object that the faculty’s obligation is minimal and even, in some cases, virtually non-existent if professors do not mentally categorize these requirements as obligations. But consider the faculty’s two distinct capacities: personal and official. In my accidental encounter with faculty outside class, I sensed the humor and personality original to academics that is often disguised by the official capacity in the classroom. The stark contrast between the two capacities makes the obligation’s impact on the university clear.

Obligation is nothing like a bureaucracy’s other, more obvious vices: it doesn’t demonstrate the most obvious symptoms, but is an underlying and almost unnoticeable cause of many problems in our university environment. Much like a disease’s origin, it starts with something small, but is capable of metastasizing into an intimidatingly unsolvable problem. At this latter stage, however, its obviousness no longer warrants any fear of uncertainty; it’s the incubation, when the result is unpredictable and the deterioration slow, that worries me the most. We, as young students feeling our love for the liberal arts squeezed out of us the first time, are facing a change so gradual that we feel powerless even to speak against the mild consequences that obligation enforces. Material needs and mental health are seemingly the only things at stake in this utilitarian age, but not what we love and would fight for unto death. Too often, we let the seemingly innocuous disease slip by, focusing on the more pressing matters at hand. Obligation, in another way, is also like an initially unthreatening disease. The inverted relationship between faculty and students, reflected through obligations, is so naturalized and seemingly harmless that we would fancy, in the infinite possibilities of the future, that obligation in a university wouldn’t poison other kinds of systems and relationships: in romantic love, familial piety, or others matters that we would abhor being corrupted by wealth. But let’s reflect on the past and soberly consider the long period in which this disease has already developed: how normal and naturalized it has become, and yet how abnormal and unnaturalized it should be for our relationships with our professors to be like this. At the onset of this new age, when the servile art’s sprawling arms may later take on much worse forms, at a time when we, not degenerated completely, may still understand the preciousness of art, music, and philosophy (which later generations may not) let’s not stay numb to the seeming normality of a culture of obligations, but fear, and tremble.

by Jason Lu

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